AI systems are not p-zombies in the philosophical sense, explains Robert Long
rgblong · x · 2026-10-06
AI welfare researcher Robert Long's short post makes a terminological point: in philosophy of mind, a p-zombie is an atom-for-atom physical duplicate of a human that behaves exactly like one yet lacks consciousness. When people call AI systems "p-zombies," they merely mean "seemingly conscious but not conscious."
No AI system is a physical duplicate of a human, nor behaviorally indistinguishable from one, so by the strict definition AI systems cannot be p-zombies. Long stresses this is a boring but important clarification: mixing the loose usage into philosophical arguments that employ the strict notion (physicalism vs dualism debates) invites confusion.
Related event: AI Systems Are Not Philosophical Zombies, Researcher Argues(2 posts)→
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