Philosopher pushes back: denying AI rights implies rejecting computational theory of mind
dioscuri · x · 2026-09-15
Responding to a dismissive take that "software cannot have interests or rights," philosopher Dan Williams argues that claiming computational systems can't have interests or rights commits you to denying the computational theory of mind—the dominant framework for explaining perception, feeling, and reasoning in modern psychology and neuroscience. He says a serious case against AI rights must examine how modern AIs are trained and function, not rely on shallow talking points.
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