Neither Turing nor Searle: a 2009 philosophy-of-mind argument revisited
gleech · x · 2026-11-19
gleech resurfaces his 2009 philosophy-of-mind essay "Neither Turing, neither Searle," offering an original rebuttal to Searle's Chinese Room: since the only system whose subjective experiences Searle knows of is himself, he either can't warrant the premise that purely syntactic systems lack experience, or the premise is false if he is such a system. The essay also recasts the Turing test's original purpose — Turing deemed "can machines think" too meaningless to discuss and replaced it with the imitation game, complete with precise memory bounds and timing forecasts.
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