Matthew Green maps the cipher construction zoo where attacks rarely generalize
matthew_d_green · x · 2026-11-03
Responding to Tessaro's claim that the space of viable symmetric constructions is overestimated, Matthew Green enumerates it: ARX in many variants, S-box designs like DES, SPN AES and wide-block AES variants, LFSR designs like Snow, table shufflers, and algebraic low-degree constructions nobody trusts. An attack on one usually does not generalize to attacks on all — countering Tessaro's optimism about generalizability.
Related event: Cryptographers Debate Whether LLMs Could Break Symmetric Encryption(6 posts)→
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