Tamper-proof agent logs still can't prove the agent did the job: who reads the record back?
ZealousidealAct9661 · reddit · 2026-10-21
An October 20 piece on signed, hash-chained agent logs draws a key distinction: a record can resist tampering without proving the agent told the truth when writing it. The poster illustrates with a concrete scenario—an agent updates a risk flag, the API returns success, the log is written, the run is sealed—yet you still need something to read the record back and confirm the intended field actually changed on the intended customer. A perfectly preserved account of a failed update is still a failed update. He cites MWYN's internal-platform agreement, which mandates logging of material actions and protects entries from deletion or modification by ordinary users, and separates acceptance requirements from actual test records—contractual requirements, not evidence checks passed. Discussion question: should the same agent certify final state, or does a separate checker own the 'done' decision, and what can that checker verify without trusting the agent's own summary?
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