RedMonk: MCP and A2A Verify Publishers, Not Safety — Registries Become the Trust Layer

rseroter · x · 2026-10-21

RedMonk's Kate Holterhoff argues developers treat MCP and A2A as trust services, though neither was designed to vouch for what it connects. A USENIX Security study found 20% of AI-generated package references point to nonexistent packages, making hallucinated names attractive attack targets. Agents pick tools from catalogs, so a poisoned listing is a direct line in: malicious MCP servers run with user-level file and credential access, and their tool descriptions are read as instructions — as in the 2025 postmark-mcp npm exploit that BCC'd every sent email to the attacker. Registries are becoming a critical trust service.

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