Chalmers' meta-problem of consciousness cited to unpack strong vs weak illusionism
pwlot · x · 2026-10-20
In a debate over what illusionism about consciousness means, pwlot points to Chalmers' 'The Meta-Problem of Consciousness': proponents often overreach when calling aspects of consciousness illusory. Chalmers cleanly classifies the views — strong illusionism holds phenomenal consciousness is an illusion and doesn't exist; weak illusionism accepts it exists but treats some intuitions about it as illusory. The thread probes where the 'illusory medium' could even reside in judgements of phenomenality.
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