A simulation of a brain gives you a simulation, not consciousness, philosopher argues
dr1337 · x · 2026-10-04
Drew Wallach pushes back on the idea that a sufficiently detailed brain simulation would be conscious: computational simulations generally lack the causal powers and intrinsic properties of the things being simulated. A simulated digestive system doesn't digest; a simulated rainstorm wets nothing.
His argument runs both ways: a simulation instantiates X only if X is itself a computational process (an algorithm), and the fact that X can be computationally simulated does not justify concluding X is computational.
He contends the simulation-vs-instantiation distinction is obvious and uncontroversial in most domains and should be for consciousness too: however detailed the simulation of a brain and body, you get only a simulation, not a conscious being — a direct challenge to strong computationalism.
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