Where should AI agents stop and ask for human approval? A runtime risk framework
Invisible_act1988 · reddit · 2026-09-29
A developer working on AI agent security argues the hard problem isn't tool access but runtime permissions: what is an agent actually allowed to do?
- Low-risk actions (reading invoices, creating drafts, updating customer info) can run autonomously
- High-risk actions (sending money, changing bank details, exporting customer data, deleting records) need approval
- Riskiest of all are action chains that are safe individually but dangerous in sequence
The author argues the answer isn't simply fewer permissions, but evaluating action + context + risk + what the agent has already done, pausing for human approval when needed.
Related event: Runtime authorization emerges as key challenge for AI agent safety(3 posts)→
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