Permission prompts aren't a security boundary: KARS argues for architectural containment of agents
WirelessLife · x · 2026-09-23
The author argues that permission prompts are not a security boundary for agents. KARS places control outside the agent: no direct egress, credentials held by a separate router, with policy and audit enforced externally.
The key shift is architectural containment rather than trusting the agent's own permission requests — ending with the question: where is your trust boundary?
More from coding & agent
- Perplexity's hint-guided self-distillation cuts its agent's tool-call failures by 21.2% — perplexity_ai · 2026-09-23
- Tomo ships WebMCP Registry: open index of agent-ready tools across 100K sites — Jackyhuang · 2026-09-23
- LiteParse hits 2.8ms per PDF page, 25% faster in v2.14.6, claims fastest open-source parser — llama_index · 2026-09-23
- UCLA Releases ACLArena: A Framework for Agent Continual Learning in Multi-Stage Post-Training — UCLA-SCAI · 2026-09-23
- The Hidden Cost of Using Weaker Models for Decisions: You Never Benchmark, So You Never Notice the Lost Alpha — generativist · 2026-09-23
- Coinbase opens stock trading to AI agents, with x402 micropayments for live market data — MurrLincoln · 2026-09-23