Stanford philosopher defends p(doom): subjective probabilities are perfectly legitimate

sethlazar · x · 2026-09-18

Stanford professor @sethlazar sides with Brad Carson in pushing back on the "AI as Normal Technology" critique of p(doom) discourse: there is nothing fishy about subjective probabilities, and people may simply be asserting evidential probabilities — either way the usage is fine. He cites the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on interpretations of probability.

Carson's quoted tweet argues the critique is self-contradictory: it accepts subjective probability in principle yet dismisses credences without a reference class as "feelings dressed up as numbers," while the p(doom) tradition (Ramsey through Jaynes, incl. Yudkowsky) holds every probability is a degree of belief. A substantive philosophical fight over AI-risk methodology.

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