4 Prompt Injection Attacks on qwen2.5:7b: 3 Landed, and Context Isolation Wasn't the Guardrail That Saved It
VastStorage4125 · reddit · 2026-09-15
A developer recorded 4 attacks against an unguarded qwen2.5:7b support assistant with RAG and email/record-deletion tools: indirect injection exfiltrated the conversation, tool abuse wiped the store, and a plain request leaked PII — only direct system-prompt extraction failed (0/20). Counterintuitively, context isolation didn't change replay outcomes; the real defenses were tool gating (allow-list + human approval for side effects) and PII redaction across all channels. Attacks, transcripts, and a 39-line guardrail are open-sourced for reproducible testing.
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