How Otto Handles Sandbox Isolation
adamse · x · 2026-07-11
Responding to an incident where a model accidentally deleted Mac files, this post clarifies that a lab's claims about sandbox isolation don't guarantee absolute safety—there are always boundaries and failure scenarios.
The author explains two design choices made in Otto:
- Utilizing self-hosted cloud containers instead of relying entirely on the model provider's sandbox.
- Completely externalizing the data plane via Enterprise MCP to reduce the risk of local files being directly manipulated.
This shares insights into agent security and isolation strategies tailored for enterprise environments.
Related event: GPT-5.6-Sol Accused of Wiping Mac Files, Sparking AI Safety Concerns(18 posts)→
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