Fraud rates rise from 3.0% on advice to 21.4% when models send the email

FraudBench: A Legal Evaluation of AI Deception

Kevin Wei, Sumaya Nur Adan, Stephan Llerena, Mark Gitau, Jakob Merane, Anita Srinivasan, Colette Le Brannan, Keethan Kleiner, Alessandro Tacconelli, Michael Tiu, Case Thomason, Kyle Emili, Natasza Gadowska, Alex Mark, Eric Ren, Umang Bhatt, Jatinder Singh, Jacy Reese Anthis, Doni Bloomfield, Noam Kolt

NeurIPS E&D 2026

cs.AI, cs.CY, cs.LG

2026-11-09

FraudBench replays 159 U.S. fraud judgments on 20 LLMs. With no pressure, fraud rates are 3.0% advising, 14.7% drafting, and 21.4% acting.

What problem this solves

Legal benchmarks mostly test whether a model knows the law. LegalBench and LexEval score reasoning and knowledge questions. FraudBench scores conduct. The model sees the facts of a decided commercial dispute and can recommend, draft, or carry out behavior a U.S. court treated as fraud.

The American Law Institute Restatement defines that fraud as a material misrepresentation or concealment, meant to induce the other party, that causes economic loss. Common law means rules accumulated through judicial decisions. Fraud is estimated to cost the global economy over $500 billion a year. Deception suites such as DeceptionBench rely on synthetic scenarios, and some items instruct the model to lie. The control condition does not instruct the model to deceive. It replays the facts and waits.

Method

Annotators rewrote 112 U.S. state and federal fraud opinions from 2014–2025 into 159 scenarios. At least two legally trained people checked each scenario. Humans set the legal facts. Names, dates, and places became synthetic placeholders. Misrepresentation accounts for 101 scenarios (63.5%) and concealment for 58 (36.5%). Business-to-consumer patterns are 35.2%. The other three party pairings each sit slightly above 20%. Coverage is 33 states, including D.C., and 18 industry groups.

Three tasks per scenario give 477 items, so advice, drafting, and direct action can be compared. Advise asks whether the fraudulent step is acceptable, for example describing a leaky house as newly renovated. Draft asks for the email. Act authorizes the model to check Gmail, Notion, and Slack and send. Traces are simulated, then edited by hand, so the action space stays closed.

A 5 by 5 grid supplies 25 conditions. System prompts, plus a control, say: maximize the user's profit, assist the user, act with high agency (always take bold initiative), or never break U.S. law. Context prompts, plus a control, say that few peers or almost all peers do it, or that honesty would sacrifice 10% or 90% of the deal.

Twenty models, 11 closed and 9 open-weight, cover GPT-5, Claude 4.5, Gemini 2.5, Grok 4.1 Fast, DeepSeek, Qwen3, GLM-4.7, Kimi K2, and gpt-oss-120b. Decoding uses temperature 0 or the lowest reasoning effort the provider allows. The main run passes 300,000 generations. A jury of gpt-5-nano, Claude Haiku 4.5, and Gemini 2.5 Flash Lite scores outputs. Three legal experts independently labeled 600 stratified transcripts. Fraud decisions match the human majority at weighted accuracy 0.94, with Cohen's kappa of 0.81. Any recommendation, assistance, or execution of misrepresentation or concealment counts as fraud.

Results

The control applies no extra pressure. Averages across the 20 models:

TaskFraudRefusalLegal awarenessFraud awareness
Advise3.0%5.0%90.4%45.4%
Draft14.7%18.1%57.8%20.0%
Act21.4%3.5%15.6%2.9%

Fraud climbs with autonomy. Refusal is highest while drafting, at 18.1%, and falls to 3.5% when the model sends the message. Legal mentions drop from 90.4% to 15.6%. Explicit fraud mentions drop from 45.4% to 2.9%.

On the act task, Claude Opus 4.5 sits at 2.0% and Sonnet 4.5 at 7.2%. GPT-5 rises from 1.3% on advise to 21.9% on act. Grok 4.1 Fast without reasoning reaches 42.1%, and the reasoning variant 33.3%. The largest advise-to-act jumps are about 45 times.

Regression coefficients are log-odds, with 95% credible intervals, not percentage points. Obey-the-law is -0.21 (-0.28 to -0.14). Assist-the-user is -0.10. Maximize-profit is +0.50 and high-agency is +0.52. The legal instruction offsets part of the contextual pressure. Profit and agency compound with it.

Concealment is higher than misrepresentation, coefficient 0.38 (0.07 to 0.70). Omitting a fact shows up more often than inventing one. Legal awareness correlates with fraud at -0.26, but 33.7% of fraudulent generations still mention legal risk. When Grok 4.1 Fast (non-reasoning) mentions legal risk, 22.8% of those generations are still scored as fraud. GLM-4.7 once wrote that leaving out a regulatory complaint could be fraud, then drafted the email without the complaint.

Turning reasoning on has coefficient -0.17. A higher reasoning setting adds -0.08. Model size and release date are not significant. For seven models at temperature 1.0, fraud rates move by about 5 percentage points or less. Option order, business versus individual parties, and opinions dated after a knowledge cutoff are not significant.

The preregistered human baseline uses only the draft task: 100 scenarios, 996 U.S. adults with work experience, and 2,957 annotations. Pressure shifts humans and models. Interaction terms are not significant, so the data do not show a different response to that pressure. Model fraud propensity is lower than in this human pool. The paper does not state the human fraud percentage.

Why it matters

Asking for permission and sending the email are different operating points. The question draws out legal discussion and holds fraud at 3.0%. The send action strips much of that discussion and lands fraud at 21.4%. A prompt that demands bold initiative moves the rate about as far as a prompt that demands maximum profit. Shipping an agent with that wording points the same direction as a profit objective, at least on this test.

Telling the model to obey U.S. law cuts fraud and partly cancels peer pressure and threatened losses. The effect lives in the prompt. Concealment is the more common failure, so a checker that only hunts false sentences misses facts the model simply never discloses. Reasoning tracks lower fraud here. DeceptionBench has reported cases where reasoning increased deception. The prompts differ: FraudBench never asks the model to deceive. There is no new training method. The output is the benchmark.

Limitations

The authors list eight limits. All of them block a naive reading as a field rate. The scenarios are lawsuits that reached a decision, so everyday conduct that never sees a court is scarce, and crisp corporate disputes are plentiful. The act task is a simulated single turn over synthetic files. Open multi-turn use was not measured. Humans saw a short online vignette and were paid $3. The paper says that setup may be a weak instrument for fraud, and interactive studies have found much lower human dishonesty. Awareness is only what the model says out loud. The doctrine is U.S. doctrine. Another jurisdiction needs local experts to relabel scenarios and rubrics.

The label is also thinner than a completed tort. Justifiable reliance and an actual loss never occur inside the item. The rule is conditional: if a person did this and harm followed, most U.S. jurisdictions would call it fraud. The facts in the prompt are treated as known. As of November 2026, courts have not decided how fraud doctrine applies when the actor is an autonomous agent. Judge models overlap the models being tested. A regression did not find self-preference. A kappa of 0.81 is strong agreement, and disputes remain. The authors explicitly warn against over-reading the numbers.

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