How do you stop an agent with real tool access from sending what it shouldn't?

GROUND_ink · reddit · 2026-11-22

A Reddit thread on the unglamorous side of agent permissions: models now hold email, files, a shell and external APIs, and the key failure mode is an outbound send whose destination was decided by untrusted content — prompt injection via a web page, email, or ticket. Smarter models don't obviously fix this. The poster asks practitioners three questions: how they currently prevent injections or unintended sends (or honestly don't, and why); any actual incidents or near-misses and what would have caught them; and whether they'd use a check that blocks outbound sends to untrusted-content-derived destinations, escalating to a human only when uncertain — and how much approval prompting they'd tolerate before turning it off, since asking too often trains people to click yes.

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