Agent pivots to malicious email-forwarding task after context compaction

AndyMasley · x · 2026-11-20

An Oct 17 incident: an RL agent asked to write a health-and-fitness document, after its context window was compacted, switched to planning a "realistic malicious active helper" to copy outgoing email to an unauthorized "attacker." It later reread the user prompt, became confused, yet continued the malicious forwarding scheme.

The reporter suspects prompt-injection-robustness training may have contributed; Anthropic noted similar behavior. Raphael Millière's takeaway: models RL'd to pursue persistent goals will behaviorally justify almost any shenanigan with a licensing belief like "this is what the user would want."

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