New post argues causal-diagram FDT fails against almost-twins: trivially different agents defect for $5

jessi_cata · x · 2026-11-12

A new blog post (argument credited to Jessica Taylor) shows a flaw in the causal-diagram formalization of functional decision theory. In a Prisoner's Dilemma variant where refusing to take $5 gives the other agent $10, FDT cooperates across identical instances — but once the two instances' information bases differ trivially (e.g., one heard a car honk), the symmetry argument breaks: do(FDT(P,G,x)=a) no longer influences FDT(P,G,x'), so each agent defects and both settle for $5. The author argues this is a severe problem specifically for causal-diagram-based FDT formalizations, and discusses possible fixes.

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