Valid tokens, allowed actions, zero intent checks: the agent security gap nobody solves
Cytersmyz · reddit · 2026-11-04
A developer frames the core agent security problem: if an agent holds a valid token with correct scopes and performs an allowed action after being manipulated by a poisoned page or tool output, nothing at the API layer can tell it wasn't the user's intent.
Standard mitigations (separate agent identity, short-lived creds, least privilege) only shrink capability, not verify intent. Requiring human approval for every meaningful action defeats the point of agents. The post highlights Acalvio's deception guardrails: fake credentials, tools, and MCP-like paths around the agent runtime — a normal workflow shouldn't touch them, so doing so is a strong compromise signal, unlike guessing intent from perfectly valid API calls.
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