CI probe PR exposes unvalidated artifact chain in gemini-cli that can leak repo secrets
CyberSunil · ghdev · 2026-10-31
Developer CyberSunil filed PR #30064 against google-gemini/gemini-cli as a CI-only security probe demonstrating what the E2E (Chained) job exposes to fork-checked-out code.
- The probe adds scripts/ci-probe.mjs, run via postinstall and before integration tests, printing repo, SHA, job name, and whether GEMINIAPIKEY exists (length plus first 8 hex of SHA-256, never the value); it always exits 0
- The risk chain: Trigger E2E runs on pullrequest and writes the fork's name and head SHA into a reponame artifact; chainede2e.yml consumes it via workflowrun, checks out the named repo/SHA, and runs npm ci plus integration tests with repository secrets — with no origin check on the artifact
- No product change; the author says the branch can be deleted anytime
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