Dvaita Vedanta's Intrinsic Validity: A Ground No AI Model Can Mimic
Paimaamu · x · 2026-10-18
The author resurfaces his Bṛhat essay on the epistemic grounding of knowledge, claiming no AI model today can mimic this kind of grounding. The core argument: fallibilism presupposes a witnessing consciousness (sākṣī) that registers successive cognitions and recognizes their incompatibility. A merely conscious but fallible witness is insufficient—it only relocates the infinite regress. The Dvaita Vedānta sākṣī provides a stable ground because its infallibility concerns not cognitive content but the act of disclosure itself; without this stable base of awareness, an endlessly revisable chain of cognitions has no standpoint from which error could ever be recognized.
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