50/50 indexical uncertainty still fails the Twin Prisoner's Dilemma

jessi_cata · x · 2026-10-18

@jessicata responds in the thread: even if an agent facing a Newcomb-style problem has a 50/50 chance of being the original or the copy — so it "should one-box," matching what it would have committed to ex ante — this reasoning still fails the Twin Prisoner's Dilemma, since each copy believes it cannot unilaterally change the outcome and defects anyway. The quoted tweet adds context: she studies imperfect-recall games and the Sleeping Beauty problem because they sketch connections across anthropics, decision theory, reinforcement learning, and consciousness, though a full formal story remains unfinished.

Related event: Decision Theory Debate: Copying an AI Constitutes Value Drift(4 posts)→

Original post →

More from AGI Musings

AGI Musings channel →