Rob Bensinger pushes back: the pretheoretic concept of phenomenal consciousness isn't nonsense
robbensinger · x · 2026-10-09
Rob Bensinger agrees with a critique that a study on consciousness definitions doesn't license its conclusions: pushing people away from near-synonyms like awareness/experience forces them to describe structural sub-processes, diverging naturally. An illusionist himself, he still argues the pretheoretic concept of phenomenal consciousness (e.g., whether a comatose loved one has experiences) has real referent.
More from AGI Musings
- The teamsters lesson: automation adjustment is least painful when newcomers just stop entering — soumitrashukla9 · 2026-10-23
- Researcher pushes back on AI cyber fear: 'labs selling defense by spreading fear' — gerardsans · 2026-10-23
- Nina Schick: compute shortage is itself a tremendous cybersecurity risk — NinaDSchick · 2026-10-23
- Investor: If AI is a bubble, it's the weirdest one ever seen — robleclerc · 2026-10-23
- Chamath: Banks will block AI agents via terms of service before anything else — nicolechirps · 2026-10-23
- AI researcher: Claude finally finished tedious research tasks I gave up on years ago — MikePFrank · 2026-10-23