Researchers debate: if an LLM feels metaphorical pain, why isn't it metaphorically a person?
dileeplearning · x · 2026-10-11
A philosophical exchange on whether the "person" metaphor applies to LLMs: Andrew Lampinen argues a person is a physical living being while intentions and beliefs are mental states, making them different kinds of metaphors. The counterpoint: so-called "mental states" in humans are ultimately physical states too, so both analogies are equally imperfect—if one accepts an LLM feels metaphorical pain and is metaphorically conscious, it's hard to deny it is metaphorically a person.
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