Josh Purtell tears apart Yudkowsky's 'LLMs are conscious' argument: functionalism doesn't get you there

JoshPurtell · x · 2026-10-04

Josh Purtell criticizes Eliezer Yudkowsky's argument that LLMs are conscious as deeply flawed. He reconstructs the chain: functionalism, plus the claim that the complexity needed for cognition is a superset of that needed for consciousness, plus the claim that math is an upper bound on cognition, therefore LLMs are conscious.

He argues this is 'a really, really bad argument': functionalism doesn't support the superset claim (step 2), and both steps 2 and 3 represent massive logical leaps. A pointed debate on AI consciousness engaging a prominent alignment figure.

Related event: AI Researchers Clash Over Whether LLMs Could Be Conscious(14 posts)→

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