"LLMs are mathematically equivalent to a book" — and why that consciousness argument backfires

mathemagic1an · x · 2026-10-04

Josh Albrecht argued that LLMs are pretty obviously not conscious and spelled out why: an LLM is a pure function f(w, s, t) -> o with fixed-size inputs and outputs, placing it in the class f(ℕ) -> ℕ—mathematically equivalent to a book.

Mathemagic1an countered that the same argument applies to any bounded physical system at finite resolution: at the Planck length, humans can also be represented in a book, so by this logic humans aren't conscious either.

The exchange highlights a structural flaw in the "equivalent to a static object" style of argument against machine consciousness.

Related event: AI Researchers Clash Over Whether LLMs Can Be Conscious(12 posts)→

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