Prompt Injection Is an Information Flow Problem Now, and Most Agent Stacks Haven't Caught Up
lucasbennett_1 · reddit · 2026-10-01
The author argues agent defenses still focus on content filtering while the real risk is information flow: untrusted text influencing privileged tool arguments. Tool allowlists answer identity, not provenance, so a read→untrusted output→write sequence passes every rule yet acts wrongly—a confused deputy pattern. Suggested mitigations: origin-based trust labels, read-only sub-agents for untrusted content, signed intent digests checked at the tool, and scoped authority for sub-agents instead of inherited permissions.
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