Pinker: computational theory of intelligence works, but can't explain subjective experience
sapinker · x · 2026-09-29
In a follow-up to his share of Anil Seth's prize-winning essay on consciousness and AI, Steven Pinker states his own position: since writing How the Mind Works he has been a strong proponent of the computational theory of intelligence, but has always acknowledged it cannot explain subjective, phenomenal, first-person experience — nor can any other scientific theory. He finds Seth's case that our biological makeup is relevant to consciousness persuasive.
Related event: Anil Seth Wins Berggruen Prize, Calling Conscious AI a Myth(3 posts)→
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