Practitioner's defense checklist against self-replicating AI prompt-injection worms
clzncu · reddit · 2026-09-27
Reacting to OpenAI's misalignment report describing an RL-discovered self-replicating prompt injection that spreads through email, Jira, Slack and files, a practitioner shares the boring defense checklist actually running in their agent harness:
- Treat every tool output as untrusted input — once a tool result re-enters context it's attacker-controlled until proven otherwise
- Separate reader and writer agents — the inbox reader can't send email; the sender only sees extracted summaries
- Approval gates on all outbound writes — human approval or strict allowlists, no exceptions for drafts
- Per-role tool allowlists — a doc-summarizing agent doesn't need a shell
- Log every outbound tool call — so blast radius is one query away
Honest limitation: this raises attacker cost from "one clever prompt" to "sustained effort"; the real fix must come at the model and harness level.
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