The Parfitian debate on personal identity in the age of AI minds
dioscuri · x · 2026-09-24
A philosophical exchange on teleporter thought experiments and personal identity: ZyMazza argues copies aren't each other, so one's existence doesn't prolong the other; dioscuri counters that individuals can be doubly instantiated at the same time, and that the deeper Parfitian point is identity has no determinate answers — only similarity across instances — citing Dynomight's 'Reasons after nonpersons' on AI consciousness dilemmas: is stopping a thinking program killing it? Is splitting an AI into two modules creating a second mind?
Related event: AI researchers debate whether mind uploading preserves the self(7 posts)→
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