Computational Models of Consciousness Prove Nothing About Machine Consciousness, Philosopher Argues
mjdramstead · x · 2026-09-19
mjdramstead amplifies a philosophical argument distinguishing computational modeling from computational metaphysics: even a complete computational model of conscious experience wouldn't guarantee the modeled processes are themselves computational in nature. The availability of computational models of consciousness thus provides no evidence for computational functionalism — and no evidence for conscious AI. The author says he'll cite this whenever artificial consciousness risks come up.
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