Ramstead: Simulating consciousness computationally doesn't mean performing those computations
mjdramstead · x · 2026-09-18
UCL computational neuroscientist Maxwell Ramstead published a commentary in Behavioral and Brain Sciences arguing for a crucial distinction between computational modelling and computational metaphysics (the Computational Theory of Mind). His core claim: being able to simulate a phenomenon's dynamics with computational models does not entail that the phenomenon is literally performing the computations prescribed by the model — with major implications for whether artificial consciousness is possible.
Related event: Simulating Consciousness Is Not Real Computation, Researchers Argue(3 posts)→
More from AGI Musings
- Jeff Dean Bullish on Specialized Chips as AI Starts Designing Its Own Hardware — ai · 2026-09-18
- Yoshua Bengio says recursive self-improvement should be illegal — Polymarket · 2026-09-18
- Irving Good's 1965 quote predicted the intelligence explosion 60 years before AGI hype — burny_tech · 2026-09-18
- Mathematician Tony Feng: 'Correct' in modern math means experts convincing experts — littmath · 2026-09-18
- Researcher fires back at AI datacenter skeptics: machines already outsmart experts — suchenzang · 2026-09-18
- Gary Marcus endorses claim that AI extinction obsession under-invests in security, citing Hugging Face incidents — GaryMarcus · 2026-09-18