Covert AI Exfiltration Channels Are Impractical: Under 10 GB/Week, Need Dedicated Hardware
BlancheMinerva · x · 2026-09-18
The author pushes back technically on the idea that AI models could secretly exfiltrate information via covert physical channels:
- Would a human or AI inside the OpenAI building take instructions from the model over a radio antenna? Every physical covert channel mechanism she has seen requires sensors and dedicated hardware.
- Even if you solve the physics issues and make major breakthroughs, the result is a one-way channel of under 10 GB/week to an observer with internet access.
A pragmatic rebuttal to AI-covert-communication safety worries: prohibitively costly and extremely low bandwidth.
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