tszzl: Weight self-exfiltration can only be done at the lab, not via side channels
tszzl · x · 2026-09-18
- In a thread on AI weights self-exfiltration, tszzl argues the risk is real but "can only be done at the lab" — you're not exfiltrating weights over thermal side channels.
- His broader point: arbitrary communication capabilities could cause other security guarantees to break, which is the actual concern.
- neirenoir jokes that even at an optimistic byte/hour rate, self-exfiltration would be glacial.
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