Philosophers clash over P(doom): subjective probabilities vs publicly justifiable beliefs
xuanalogue · x · 2026-09-18
Philosopher Seth Lazar and xuanalogue debate P(doom) in AI risk discourse. Lazar defends subjective probabilities as perfectly fine for p(doom) claims, citing the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. xuanalogue counters that while Bayesian beliefs are those we'd bet on, beliefs for public decision-making should be ones we can justify to others. The core question: whether personal subjective probability suffices for public AI-risk claims.
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