Signing TLS handshakes inside a TPM to protect machine identity
jedisct1 · x · 2026-09-07
- 传统的 mutual TLS 客户端私钥以文件形式存于磁盘，进程启动即读入内存，随后出现在堆转储、core dump、交换页乃至虚拟机快照中，任何拿到读权限的攻击者都能冒充该机器。
- 作者明确划定威胁模型：防御的是 guest 内部的文件读取、SSRF、误备份等场景，不防御已获得持久代码执行的攻击者。
- 解法是把签名操作放进 TPM，私钥永不离开硬件，并给出 Go 实现细节。这是其机密虚拟机远程证明工作的一环。
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