Agents That Act Made Prompt Injection Real: One Red Team Exercise Showed Why
Ashamed_Stodach_5657 · reddit · 2026-09-07
An engineer recounts how prompt injection shifted from an academic concern to a real threat once their agents could call tools, write databases, and trigger workflows. A red-team document with embedded instructions made an agent attempt an unrelated tool call—only narrow permission scoping prevented damage. Many agent permissions were set for convenience during development and never revisited, and a single red-team pass can't cover payloads used months later.
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