Seth's case against machine consciousness reads as an extended enthymeme
yeastsplainer · x · 2026-09-05
After a close read of Seth's long paper on biological naturalism, the author finds no grounds for his certainty that computers can't be conscious. The argument amounts to an extended enthymeme — brains differ from computers in ways x, y & z, therefore computers are unlikely to be conscious — with no serious engagement with qualia, HOTs, or access vs phenomenal consciousness, nor why x, y & z are required. Seth is also criticized for repeating sound bites like 'vanishingly unlikely' while dodging requests for justification.
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