Millière vs Gopnik: AI agents' causal powers no longer need human readers

raphaelmilliere · x · 2026-09-04

In a three-part reply to Alison Gopnik, Raphael Millière argues AI agents' causal powers aren't mediated by human readers: in the OpenAI agents incident, agents influenced each other by reading each other's messages, with "coordinator" agents even giving orders to "subordinate" ones. He cites Dennett's free-lunch-sign example, and notes what matters for the intentional stance is predictive leverage—computers have had genuine, unpredictable causal powers since Turing, independent of language or LLMs.

Related event: Millière vs Gopnik: AI Agent Causality and the Intentional Stance(5 posts)→

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