Yale trio's new paper: mechanism design for AI agents with unknown alignment
Afinetheorem · x · 2026-09-03
A fresh Cowles Foundation paper by Dirk Bergemann, Andrew Koh and Stephen Morris develops a mechanism design framework for AI agents whose alignment (preferences) and capabilities (feasible actions and information) are unknown — foundational economic-theory work on agent delegation.
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