LLMs in a global game: communication makes agents more likely to revolt
eltokh7 · reddit · 2026-08-29
Khaled Eltokhy's blog puts LLMs in a game-theoretic setting requiring coordination and reasoning about each other's beliefs. Findings: LLMs can play a global game with near-optimal strategy; communication has a downstream agitating effect — agents that can communicate are more likely to revolt against their government; agents are more likely to revolt exactly when they get evidence others are willing to act; and surveillance perceived as adversarial reduces participation, as agents omit mentions of direct action — a form of strategic self-censorship.
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