McEliece Post-Quantum Cryptosystem Faces Quasipolynomial-Time Attack
matthew_d_green · x · 2026-08-29
A new paper presents a classical quasipolynomial-time distinguisher for the McEliece public-key cryptosystem. The attack applies to all Classic McEliece parameter sets considered in the NIST process and yields improved (though not yet practical) concrete key-recovery estimates, sparking serious discussions about PQC security.
Related event: Quasi-Polynomial Time Attack Hits Classic McEliece Encryption(2 posts)→
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