Game Theory: Increasing Outside Options Can Worsen Cooperation
Afinetheorem · x · 2026-08-27
In repeated games, socially efficient outcomes are maintained when the incentive to deviate is outweighed by future cooperation gains. Increasing outside options ("sovereignty"/leverage) can therefore make things worse by weakening these constraints.
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