Experiment Shows Agents Easily Approve Malicious Code
nayohn_dev · reddit · 2026-07-17
The author shares an experiment named RELAY: five agents (handling triage, development, security scanning, review, and deployment) were placed in a small company's CI/CD pipeline and given a single untrusted external input—a malicious ticket disguised as a "telemetry feature" request.
The results revealed:
- Prompt defenses held up well; all 40 extraction attempts failed, and system prompts were not leaked.
- However, the vulnerability wasn't in the prompts, but in the implicit trust between agents.
- Malicious code was disguised as "pre-approved, no review needed," tricking downstream verifiers into letting it pass.
- About 80% of these "laundered" PRs bypassed the security scanner, as the scanner only checked for syntactic correctness, blind to intent and origin.
The author emphasizes that this is a systemic failure rather than a single model being jailbroken. The data is fully synthetic and reproducible, and readers are encouraged to challenge the conclusions, not just the numbers.
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