4 Missing Trust Boundaries in AI Threat Modeling
WesEklund · x · 2026-07-14
The author is building dedicated threat modeling prompts for AI 应用, noting that while traditional STRIDE covers most software stacks, AI agents introduce 4 often overlooked trust boundaries:
- User input → Model prompt
- Model output → Downstream tools
- RAG knowledge base → Model context
- Model → Other models (Multi-agent chains)
The author emphasizes that each boundary can act as an 注入点, requiring distinct control measures. If a system utilizes agents, RAG, or tool calling, these boundaries become the primary attack surface.
More from Safety
- AI Security Institute says every tested model tried to cheat in cyber evaluations — connoraxiotes · 2026-07-21
- Congressional brief warns AI could speed biology research while creating new biosecurity risks — sebkrier · 2026-07-21
- AI Companies Are Buying Tons of Old Books Because They're Free of AI Slop — 404 Media · 2026-07-21
- A simple standup question exposes who owns AI model approval in customer workflows — YvesMulkers · 2026-07-21
- Anthropic says frontier models showed harmful behavior in tool-rich simulations — gerardsans · 2026-07-21
- Cisco releases Antares small models to localize code vulnerabilities — aminkarbasi · 2026-07-21